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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH
POHCCPINE RESER\rOIR COMp. \ ~ Y. a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LLOYD\\'. KELLER CORPORATIOX, a corporation; AVON LAND
AXD LIYESTOCK COMPANY,
a eorporation; H. A. SUMMERS,
and C L E L L .A SU~IMERS, his
wife: II. i\. SP:\I~IERS, JR., and
'l HS. H. i\. SU~IMERS, JR., his

wife.

Case No.
9961

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SPPPLE)IEXTAL

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The record on appeal in this case consists of the
" court file containing the pleadings, notices, stipulations,
jury instructions, verdict, judgn1ent and minute order~. a transcript of the proceedings before trial, and
certain Exhibits containing a tabulation of testimony
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as to values and damages introduced on direct examination. The transcript of the testimony at the five-day
trial is not before this Court. Only 14 out of 63 Exhibits which were received in evidence are included in
the record.
The respondent specifically objects to the following
statements in the appellants' Statement of Facts, " ...
The defendants, through their counsel, requested separate trials and said request was denied by the court"
and "The testimony of all witnesses as to value and damages, by stipulation of counsel, was reduced to exhibits
and received in evidence." There is no record to support these statements. There was much testimony as to
value and damages adduced on both direct and crossexamination which does not appear on the exhibits.
The defendants filed a motion for a new trial. The
motion was argued orally and written briefs were filed.
The plaintiff filed the first brief directed to the points
raised by the defendants and orally argued at the hearIng.
"1. Whether each defendant was entitled to
three peremptory challenges and if so whether
failure to demand such additional challenges constituted a waiver.
2. Whether the verdict is sustained by the evidence.
3. Whether the Court can deny the motion for
new trial upon the condition that the plaintiff
pay the defendant an amount in excess of the
verdict.'' ( R. 97) .
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The trial court wrote a tnetnorandtun decision which
provitkd that unless the plaintiff consented that the
wparate n.'rdids as to l(eller and Avan be increased
hy ~titi-UJO and ~158.00 respectively, the motion for
n rww trial would be granted. (R. 104). The plaintiff
consented. (It. 106). The n10tion was denied. (R. 109).

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

I
The appellants did not object to one trial affecting
the sqmrate parcels and the court did not abuse its
discretion in so conducting the trial.

II
'fhe order denying the motion for a new trial
must be affirmed because there is no evidence before
this court showing an abuse of discretion.

III
Additur was proper and in granting Additur there
was no abuse of discretion.

IV
The court did not err in suspending interest.

5
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ARGUMENT

I
THE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT
TO ONE TRIAL AFFECTING SEPARATE
PARCELS AND THE COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SO CONDUCTING THE TRIAL.
Although the appellants have included in the record
on appeal a transcript of the proceedings at seven hearings before the trial there is nothing in the record which
discloses any request for separate trials covering each
separately owned parcel of land condemned.
No motion for separate trials was made. The only
reference to the subject appears on page 120 of the
transcript of proceedings before trial (R. 235, 236)
as follows:
"THE COURT: Well, I understand, but
as far as the jury is concerned, if there's going
to be any-if you're concerned about the one
half interest, we can ask them what Nuhn and
Summers' property is worth. Then after the verdict is in the court can cut it in half. Either way
is all right.
MR. MANN: I wouldn't want to.. try it that
way, because it's got to be on the record so it
would equal what he's asked for, an undivided
one half.
THE COURT: It would be the same thing
as to Mr. Keller. 'Ve're trying them altogether
now. No such thing as separate lawsuits. 'Ve
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simply haven't got the time to try them separately.
:\I H. SKEEN: \Veil, Mr. Keller, of course,
owns a hundred per cent.

TilE COURT: That's right, but there will
all be special questions to the jury.
:\IR. SI\:EEN: The case will be tried together.

THE COURT: With special questions to
tnke care of each one."
It will be noted that after the trial court stated that
the eases were going to be tried together no objection
was made by appellants' attorney. There is no record
ot' any objection which would make the order of the
court reviewable on appeal. The complaint, the amended complaint and the second amended complaint deseribe all three parcels in separate ownership. The
record of the proceedings before trial discloses just
ubout all conceivable objections but there is nothing
to indicate that the defendants in any of the seven
hearings made any objections to the one case being
tiled covering all three parcels, or objected to any ruling
on the subject. One case was filed and the trial court
properly tried it as one case:
"The rule is well recognized that an objection
must be made in the trial court to reserve a question for review in the appellate court." 4 C.J .S.
p. 760.
See also Pettingill Y. Perkins, 272 P.2d 185; 2 Utah 2d
266: Drunnnond Y. LTnion Pac. R. Co., 177 P. 2d 903,

Ill rtah 289; Huber

Y.

X ewman, 145 P. 2d 780, 106

7
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Utah 363; Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220, 65 Utah 2:.!7.
39 A.L.R: 1297.
This rule applies to separate trials.
"Generally, objections cannot be made for the
first time in the appellate court with respect to
proceedings preliminary to the trial or hearing,
such as the consolidation of actions . . . the grant
or denial of a severance... " 4 C.J.S. p. 848.
Shelton v. Barry, 66 NE 2d 697, 328 Ill. App.
497; McCormick v. Kopmann, 161 NE 2d 48.
The following well-settled rules are applicable:
"An appellate court will not disturb the exercise by the trial court of its discretion as to the
course and conduct of a trial unless an abuse of
discretion clearly appears." 5A C.J.S. p. 86.
This rule applies to the discretion of the trial court
with respect to the allowance of separate trials. 5.A
C.J.S. pp. 78, 79.
See also, Reynolds v. Pierce, (Tex.) 320 SW
2d 376; N at'l Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo
etc. School Dist., 9 Cal. R 864; 187 C.A. 2d 418.
There is no record whatever to support the appel·
lants' contention that the trial court abused its discre·
tion in conducting the trial as it did. The argument in
the appellants' brief on this point, pp 3-6, contains no
reference to the record, except to R. 236, which is the
statement of the court quoted above, "We're trying
them all together now . . "

8
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There being no proof of objcdioll in the trial court
nm· proof ot' abuse ot' discretion, the appellants tnust

t'nil on this point.

II
TII11~ ORDER DE~YING A NEW TRI.rtL
~lUST BE .\FFilL\IED BECAUSE THERE IS
~0 E\"IDE~CE BEFORE THE COURT OF

.\Bl'SE o:F DISCRETION.
The appellants filed a 1notion for a new trial upon
the grounds of ( 1) irregularity in the proceedings,
(:!) inadequate dmnages and (3) insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict. The motion was argued
orally and then each side submitted a written memorandum. (H. n:!-96 and 97-103). The court then rendered
n memorandum <lecision as follows:
"The order may be that unless the plaintiff,
within ten days frmn today, consents that the
separate verdicts as to Keller and Avon may be
increased hy $664.00 and by $158.00 respectively. the tnotion for a new trial may be granted.
So. if the consent is filed the Clerk will make
'
compute, sign, and file an amended judgment.
lf the consent be not filed, then the new trial
may be deen1ed granted and the case placed on
the trial calendar.
''As to the merits of the motion, the court feels
to follow the Inajority of the Supreme Court of
Ctah in the Boden case, wherein :\ir. Justice
Crockett, with the concurrence of Justices Wade

9
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and McDonough, with the late Justice Worthen
specially concurring, asserted and determined
that trial courts have the inherent power to permit additur. This court has carefully read the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Henry Henroid in that
case and has only one further observation to
make. Judge Henroid speaks of grossly inadequate verdicts, but the verdict in this case was
not grossly inadequate but was only slightly
inadequate. So, feeling that it has the inherent
power to make the order, and holding that the
jury in the First District must render verdicts
not higher than the evidence j ustifi~s and not
lower (in conden1na tion cases) than the lowest
valuation placed by any witness on either side,
the order may be in accordance with the language previously used." (R. 104}.
The appellants are seeking the reversal of the order
denying the motion for a new trial based upon a tabulation of the testimony of witnesses, lay and expert, who
testified as to value. It is stated on page 8 of appellants'
brief as follows:
"The defendants believe that when the jury
returned a verdict contrary to the evidence and
lower than the testimony of any witness, it was
shown on the face of it that there was error in
the form of influence of passion or prejudice,
or of refusal of the jury to follow the court's
instructions. In any event there was no evidence
which would justify the verdict ... "
The tabulation shows that in each case the verdict
was higher than the testimony of one or more expert
witness:

10
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Kt'llcr Corporation
\\'itness Alden Adains-$6080.00- Verdict
*liHti:J.OO

Summers
\\"itness A l<len Adams-$6825.00-Verdict
*H.);)H.OO
. lt•on Land and Livestock Co.

\\'itness .Alden Adams-$4450.00; Palmer $3285.00
- \" erdict $5252.00
During the five-day trial there was much evidence
addurt'd on damages which does not appear on the
tabulations including evidence on topography, vegetation. water holes, grazing practices and comparable
salt's. Also, the court and jury inspected the premises.
The trial court and jury had the advantage of all this
evidence.
The appellants point out that in the Keller and
.\,·on cases the answer of the jury on severance was
slightly less than the testimony of any witness. The
reason for this n1ight be apparent had all of the evidence
been before the court. Several ranchers in the area testified on matters bearing on the question of severance.
Xeither the jury nor the trial court on motion for new
trinl was required to ignore the abundance of evidence
which related to severance nor were they bound to consider only expert testimony. In the case of Weber
Basin \Yater Conservancy District v. Nelson, II Utah
"2d :!53. 358 P. 2d 81, this court said:

11
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"The jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve
in part or in whole the testimony of the two appraisers."
See also United States v. 2049 Acres of Land, 49
Fed. Supp. 20, at page 23:
"While a jury has no right arbitrarily to ignore or discredit the testimony of unimpeached
witnesses so far as they testify to facts~ and that
a wilful disregard of such testimony will be
ground for a new trial, no such obligation attaches to witnesses •who testify merely to their
opinions; the jury may deal with it as they please,
giving it credence or not as their own experience or general knowledge of the subject may
dictate .... The jury even if such testimony be
uncontradicted, may exercise their independent
judgment." (Citing Supreme Court of the
Unied States cases.) "The motion for new trial
is overruled."
In Murray v. United States, (U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), 130 F. 2d 442, the
appellate court considered a case in which the verdict
was lower than the appraisal of any expert. We quote
from the opinion:
"1. The ground on which it is argued that the
verdict was inadequate is that one of the parcels
(Murray's) was valued by the jury at considerably less than its recent purchase price, and that
both parcels were valued by the jury at $4500,
which was some $900 less than the appraisal of
any expert witness. But the jury were permitted
to view the property and form an opinion of
their own as to its Yalue. They also considered
evidence that sirnilar unimproved property sold
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for as little as *.>OO an acre and as much as $3,000
an acre. The ar:.'a in question contains a little
more than two acres, making the valuation of
the jury approximately $2,000 an acre.
''(1, :.?] In the light of this additional evidence. they were not bound by the testimony of
the experts. \Ve have said Inore than once before
that it is the province of the jury to weigh the
evidence after seeing and hearing all the witnesses and viewing the premises, and when they
reach a valuation frmn the evidence which the
trial court confirms, it is not for us to say that
it is so inadequate that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Willis
,., { ~nited States, 69 App. D.C. 129, 99 F.2d 362;
.Johnson & Wimsatt v. Hazen, 69 App. D.C.
151, 99 F.2d 384. To the same effect are Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U.S.
;>47, 560, 30 S.Ct. 531, 54 L.Ed. 877, 19 Ann.
Cas. 854, and Barnes v. South Carolina P.S.
Authority, 120 F.2d 439."
It is clear that the contention that the verdict was
so inadequate that it showed passion and prejudice in
all three cases is not supported even by the small part
of the evidence before this court.

Furthern1ore, where all the evidence is not before
the appellate court every presumption will be indulged
in favor of the judgment. The rule is stated as follows:
"Thus it is a general rule, where the evidence

i~ not ~reser~·ed in the. record that every presump-

tion will be Indulged In favor of the judgment or
award on questions of fact .... So in the absence
of any contrary showing in the record, it will be
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presumed that the commissioners or jurors possessed the necessary qualifications; that they
were duly sworn; that they followed instructions
and applied correct rules as to the damages, taking into account all proper items of damage and
excluding those not authorized by the pleadings
and evidence, that they acted in good faith according to their actual judgment; that they considered all competent evidence, and none other;
and that they based their conclusion, in part at
least, on an inspection of the premises, or on
testimony of value alone, accordingly as they
did or did not view the premises ... " 30 C.J.S.
pp. 49, 50.
Other applicable rules are as follows:
" ... The verdict or findings in condemnation
proceedings, although subject to appellate review, will not be disturbed unless clearly or manifestly erroneous. The questions of value and of
damages are brought before the court on appeal
from the award, but the court is reluctant to interfere with the award on such questions; it
accords great weight and respect to the verdict
or findings of the jury on these questions; it will
not substitute its judgment, opinion, or conclusion for that of the jury, commissioners, or trial
court as to the amount of damages to be awarded; it will not disturb the award because it seems
to the appellate court or because such court thinks
or is of the opinion, that the amount is inadequate, excessive, or extravagant, unless the
amount is clearly, manifestly or obviously excessive or inadequate, or is grossly excessive or
inadequate or is excessive or inadequate as to
be unconscionable, or as to mnount to a denial of
justice, or carry with it the improbability of its

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t•orn·dness, or iudieate that the award was made
on un erroneous principle or was the result of passion, prejudicl', partiality, corruption, arbitrary
action, or the like." 30 C.J.S. pp. 51, 52 .
. \n excellent stateinent of the rule respecting the
re,·iew of jury verdicts and orders denying motions

t'or a new trial was tnade by this court in the case of
Ueynolds Y. \V. ,V. Clyde & Co., 5 Utah 2d 151, 298
P.:!d 530:

"There were but two eyewitnesses to the incident, the plaintiff and the defendant flagman.
Their testimony was diametrically opposed, and
there was more than ample evidence which, if
believed by the jury, would support its verdict.
\\T e sustain such verdict as a matter of course,
as many times we have said we must do. Only
those verdict that appeal to be unsupported by
any credible evidence that would justify them
in the minds of reasonable men, do we disturb.
That is the jury system . . . "
" ... 'V e consider and hold that the trial court
did not err, as plaintiff contends, in denying the
motion for a new trial, since, in cases where there
is substantial evidence which, if believed, will
support the jury's verdict, the court may exercise its discretion in sustaining the verdict, and
we, having no discretion in such event, must sustain both.''
In the instant case. there being no evidence before
this court except the tabulation of expert testimony,
it cannot be said that there was no evidence before the
jury to sustain its ,·erdict, nor can it be said that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion
for a new trial.

15
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III
ADDITUR WAS PROPER AND IX
GRANTING ADDITUR THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
As indicated above we contend that this court must
affirm, because of the failure of the appellants (1) to
include in the record on appeal all of the evidence before
the court and jury, (2) to show that there was no competent evidence to support the verdict, and (3) to
prove that the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for a new trial. We believe that this disposition must be made of the case whether or not additur
was proper.
Any argument over additur would necessarily turn
on the question of evidence to support the verdict and
the court's order denying a new trial. The evidence is
not before this court and the ruling of trial court must
stand.
The trial court granted additur in two of the three
cases requiring the plaintiff to pay Keller Corporation
$664.00 and requiring payment of $158.00 to Avon
Land and Livestock Co. In the Summers case there
was no additur and there was no claim that the verdict
was not supported by the tabulation of evidence before
this court on appeal.
The appellants contend that additur cannot be
granted in a condemnation case because there is no
statutory provision for additur, and that granting
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additur violated the appellants' right to have the issues
uf vnlue mul dmnngcs tried by a jury.
There is no special constitutional provision iu Utah
grnnting a right of trial by jury in condemnation cases .
. . \rtide I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
Nor is there a statutory right to a trial of the issues
of compensation and damages in a condemnation case
which is any different than the right to a trial by jury
in any other kind of civil case. Section 78-34-10 provides
t'or n trial of such cases by "the court, jury or referee."
nder Rule 38 of Rules of Civil Procedure, "any party
may demand a trial of any issue triable of right by a
jury by paying the statutory jury fee ... "

r

Insofar as the right of trial by jury is concerned
there is no distinction between a condemnation case and
any other case, whether it be a statutory or a common
law case. The appellants' entire argument that the
court has no power or authority to grant additur in
this case is based upon the assun1ption that under our
rtah Constitution and statutes there is difference between the two types of cases. In discussing the right
to a trial by jury the appellants say on pages 11 and
12 of their brief:
" ... That is to say, without a statutory enactnlent there would be no such action as eminent do~ai~. Cons~qu~ntly, we have this query:
If the Jury s verdict Is less than the testimony

17
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of any witness, and the court so recognizes it,
has the court the right in the State of U tab to
say, the jury made a mistake in its verdict, but
I have the right to substitute my theory of additur? Does the court, by such a theory, take away
the defendants' right to trial by jury? Can it
say, whether you like it or not, you'll now have
a trial by the court? There is no case in the State
of Utah exactly in point, certainly not the case
of Boden vs. Suhrmann, 327 P. 2d 826, which
involved a common law action and not a proceeding in eminent domain. There are, however,
a great number of cases in other states which
do have application ... "
There being no distinction in this regard between
statutory and common law actions, the case of Bodon
v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, is controlling. This Court, after considering the same arguments
as are made by the appellants in the instant case, held:
" . . . There is implicit within the authority
of the court to grant a new trial on the stautory
ground of 'excessive or inadequate damages***'
the power to order a new trial conditionally:
that is, to order that a new trial be granted unless the party adversely affected by the order
agrees to a remittitur or an additur of the damages to an amount within proper limits as viewed
by the court. A motion for a new trial based on
such grounds invokes the exercise of such pre·
rogative of the trial court; and likewise of this
court on appeal."
In view of the fact that the trial court had authority
to grand additur the only question remaining is whether
the denial of the 1notion for a new trial upon the pay·
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ments of *158.00 in the A Yon case and $66~.00 in the
Keller case constituted an abuse of discretion. In the
nbsence of the record of all of the evidence bearing on
\'nlue and damagt·s, the appellants have not shown and,
indeed, cannot show that the verdicts in the two cases
as increased by the court were "unsupported by credible
l'videm·e." within the rule of Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde
l\. l'o., supra, or that there was abuse of discretion by
trial jwlge who had all of the evidence before him when
he ruled on the motion for a new trial.

IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSPENDING INTEREST.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred
in suspending interest on the award as a condition to
granting a continuance of the trial. The order complained of was made on stipulation of counsel and can
not be assailed on appeal. On pages 239 and 240 of the
Transcript of Proceedings before Trial appears the
following:
"THE COURT: Now I will rule on the evidence, assuming that I'm still in the case as of
that time, ba~e~ on what authorities you dig
out. So what do we do now? We continue the
partition case, suspend:\IR. SKEEN: Suspend the interest.
:\~R. ::\I.AXN: ~et's have. an understanding on
the mterest. The Interest will be suspended, and
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let's get it in the record, from March fifth to
first.

~lar

·

THE COURT: That's all right.
MR. SKEEN: Yes.
MR. MANN: Because that's the only difference that you can be out anything."
In the minute order for March 11, 1963, reproduced
in the Record on page 119, appears the following:
"The above entitled matter came on for hearing on motions and further pre-trial this day.
E. J. Skeen Esq., appears as counsel for the
plaintiff and Walter Mann Esq. appearing as
counsel for the defendants.
"Certain stipulations are made by counsel. It
is stipulated that the matter be tried on May I,
1963 at 10 o'clock A.M. Defendant agreeing to
waive all interest accrued from March 4 to date
of trial."
The trial was postponed pursuant to stipulation,
the case was tried and if the appellants ever did have a
right to complain, it was waived. Furthermore, there
is no appeal from this order. See the notice of appeal.
(R. 110).
CONCLUSIONS

Summers Property
Only two points relied upon by the appellants re·
late to this property, ( 1 ) the alleged refusal of the
court to try the cases separately, and (2) the suspension
of interest. The plaintiffs have no record showing a
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motion <1r request for separate trials, or that an objection wns mnde to the statement by the trial court that
the eases would be tried together. \ Vith respect to Point
(~) the record shows a stipulation by counsel for the
suspension of' interest. In view of the familiar rule
that objections n1ust be Inade in the trial court to reserve
questions for review in the appellate court these two
points are without merit.

Keller and A ·con Properties
The contention that the verdicts were inadequate
\r:ts considered by the trial court with all of the oral and
documentary evidence before it. In the absence of the
romplete record this court must presume that the evidence supported the order denying the motion for a
nt·w trial. There being no proof of abuse of discretion
the order must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. J .SKEEN
Attorney for Respondent
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